Probability & Statistics Codexery

Prior probability

Prior probability represents belief before new evidence.

Prior probability

A prior probability distribution (often simply called the prior probability, prior distribution, or prior) of an uncertain quantity is its assumed probability distribution before evidence is taken into account. In Bayesian statistics, Bayes' rule prescribes how to update the prior with new information to obtain the posterior probability distribution. The choice of priors was historically constrained to conjugate families for tractability, but Markov chain Monte Carlo methods have reduced this concern.

definition
Assumed probability distribution before evidence
role
Foundation for Bayesian updating
types
Informative, weakly informative, uninformative
construction_methods
Past information, expert elicitation, principle of indifference, mechanical properties
key_concept
Hyperparameters and hierarchical priors
controversy
Objective vs. subjective Bayesianism

Lore & Background

A prior can be determined from past information, such as previous experiments, or elicited from the subjective assessment of an experienced expert. When no information is available, an uninformative prior may be adopted as justified by the principle of indifference. In modern applications, priors are often chosen for mechanical properties like regularization and feature selection.

Reader's Guide

The concept of prior probability is central to Bayesian statistics, providing a formal mechanism to incorporate existing knowledge into statistical analysis. Its significance lies in enabling the updating of beliefs via Bayes' rule, producing posterior distributions that combine prior information with new data. The historical constraint of conjugate priors for tractability has been largely overcome by computational methods like Markov chain Monte Carlo, broadening the applicability of Bayesian methods. The construction of priors ranges from informative (based on past data or expert opinion) to weakly informative (for regularization) to uninformative (based on principles like indifference or invariance). The philosophical debate between objective and subjective Bayesianism highlights the tension between seeking logically required priors and acknowledging the subjective nature of prior beliefs. This debate, exemplified by arguments from Edwin T. Jaynes and others, underscores that priors represent a state of knowledge rather than an observer-independent feature of the world. The legacy of prior probability is its foundational role in Bayesian inference, enabling principled uncertainty quantification across scientific disciplines.

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